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We study in details the turnout rate statistics for 77 elections in 11 different countries. We
show that the empirical results established in a previous paper for French elections appear to hold
much more generally. We find in particular that the spatial correlation of turnout rates decay
logarithmically with distance in all cases. This result is quantitatively reproduced by a decision
model that assumes that each voter makes his mind as a result of three influence terms: one totally
idiosyncratic component, one city-specific term with short-ranged fluctuations in space, and one
long-ranged correlated field which propagates diffusively in space. A detailed analysis reveals several
interesting features: for example, different countries have different degrees of local heterogeneities
and seem to be characterized by a different propensity for individuals to conform to the cultural
norm. We furthermore find clear signs of herding (i.e. strongly correlated decisions at the individual
level) in some countries, but not in others.
I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies and models of election statistics have attracted considerable attention in the recent physics
literature, see e.g. [1–9]. In [10], the present authors have studied the statistical regularities of the electoral turnout
rates, based on spatially resolved data from 13 French elections since 1992. Two striking features emerged from our
analysis: first, the distribution of the logarithmic turnout rate τ (defined precisely below) was found to be remarkably
stable over all elections, up to an election dependent shift. Second, the spatial correlations of τ was found to be well
approximated by an affine function of the logarithm of the distance between two cities. Based on these empirical
results, we proposed that the behaviour of individual agents is affected by a space dependent “cultural field”, that
encodes a local bias in the decision making process (to vote or not to vote), common to all inhabitants of a given
city. The cultural field itself can be decomposed into an idiosyncratic part, with short range correlations, and a slow,
long-range part that results from the diffusion of opinions and habits from one city to its close-by neighbours. We
showed in particular that this local propagation of cultural biases generates, at equilibrium, the logarithmic decay of
spatial correlations that is observed empirically [10].
The aim of the present note is to provide additional support to these rather strong statements, using a much larger
set of elections from different countries in the world. We discuss in more depth the approximate universality of the
distribution of turnout rates, and show that some systematic effects in fact exist, related in particular, to the size of the
cities. We also confirm that the logarithmic decay of the spatial correlations approximately holds for all countries and
all elections, with parameters compatible with our diffusive field model. The relative importance of the idiosyncratic,
city dependent contribution and of the slow diffusive part is however found to be strongly dependent on countries.
We also confirm the universality of the logarithmic turnout rate for different elections, for different regions or for
different cities, provided the mean and the width of the distribution is allowed to depend on the city size. Overall,
our empirical analysis provides further support to the binary logit model of decision making, with a space dependent
mean (the cultural field mentioned above).
II. DATA AND OBSERVABLES
We have analyzed the turnout rate at the scale of municipalities for 77 elections, from 11 different countries. For
some countries, the number of different elections is substantial: 22 from France (Fr, ≈ 36000 municipalities in mainland
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2France) [11], 13 from Austria (At, ≈ 2400 municipalities) [12], 11 from Poland (Pl, ≈ 2500 municipalities) [13], 7
from Germany (Ge, ≈ 12000 municipalities) [14], while for others we have less samples: 5 from Canada (Ca, ≈ 7700
municipalities) [15], 4 from Romania (Ro, ≈ 3200 municipalities) [16], 4 from Spain (Sp, ≈ 8000 municipalities in
mainland Spain) [17], 4 from Italy (It, ≈ 7200 municipalities in mainland Italy) [18], 3 from Mexico (Mx, ≈ 2400
municipalities) [19], 3 from Switzerland (CH, ≈ 2700 municipalities) [20] and 1 from Czech Republic (Cz, ≈ 6200
municipalities)[21]. More details on the nature of these elections and some specific issues are given in Appendix.
For each municipality and each election, the data files give the total number of registered voters N and the number
of actual voters N+, from which one obtains the usual turnout rate π = N+/N ∈ [0, 1]. For reasons that will become
clear, we will instead consider in the following the logarithmic turnout rate (LTR) τ , defined as:
τ := ln(
π
1− π
) , τ ∈]−∞,+∞[. (1)
Because we know the geographical location of each city, the knowledge of τ for each city enables us to create a map
of the field τ(~r) and study its spatial correlations.
III. STATISTICS OF THE LOCAL TURNOUT RATE
Whereas the average turnout rate is quite strongly dependent on the election (both on time and on the type of
election – local, presidential, referendum, etc.), the distribution of the shifted LTR τ−〈τ〉 was found to be remarkably
similar for the 13 French elections studied in [10].1 The LTR standard-deviation, skewness and kurtosis were found
to be very similar between different elections. The distribution P (u) of the shifted and rescaled LTR,
u =
τ − 〈τ〉
σ
, with σ2 = 〈τ2〉 − 〈τ〉2 (2)
was found to be very close in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) sense.
We have extended this analysis to the 9 new election data in France, and to all new countries mentioned above. For
France, the Elections Municipales (election of the city mayor), not considered in [10], have a distinctly larger standard
deviation than national elections. However, P (u) is again found to be similar for all the French elections, except the
Re´gionales of 1998 and 2004. These happen to be coupled with other local elections in half municipalities, which
clearly introduces a bias. The distributions P (u) for all elections in France are shown in Fig. 1 and compared to a
Gaussian variable. The distribution is clearly non Gaussian, with a positive skewness equal to ≈ 1.1 and a kurtosis
equal ≈ 4.8. A more precise analysis consists in computing the KS distances between each pair of elections. We recall
here that a KS distance of dKS = 1 corresponds to a ≈ 20% probability that the two tested distribution coincide,
while dKS = 1.6 corresponds to a ≈ 1% probability. Removing the Re´gionales, we find that the KS distance dKS
averaged over all pairs of elections is equal to 1.49, with a standard deviation of 0.47. These numbers are slightly too
large to ascertain that the distributions are exactly the same since in that case the average dKS should be equal to√
π/2× ln 2 ≈ 0.87. On the other hand, these distances are not large either (as visually clear from Fig. 1), meaning
that while systematic differences between elections do exist, they are quite small. We will explain below a possible
origin for these differences.
The same analysis can be done for all countries separately; as for France, we find that P (u) for different elections are
all similar, except for Germany for which 〈dKS〉 = 3 – see Table I, where we show the mean and the standard-deviation
of KS distances between elections of a given country, and of the skewness and kurtosis of the distributions P (u) in
a given country. Note that the values of 〈dKS〉 are close to 0.87 for Italy and Poland. On the other hand, these
distributions is clearly found not to be identical across different countries. Table II shows the matrix of KS distances
between countries “super-distributions”.2 The values of dKS are all large, except for the pairs Fr-Cz, Fr-CH, Sp-CH,
Sp-Ro and CH-Cz.
In order to understand better these results, one should first realize that the statistics of the LTR does in fact
strongly depend on the size of the cities. This was already pointed out in [10, 22]. For example, the average LTR for
all cities of size N (within a certain interval), that we denote as 〈τ〉N ≡ mN , is distinctly N dependent, see Fig. 2. In
most cases, the average turnout rate is large in small cities and declines in larger cities, with notable exceptions: for
1 The notation 〈. . . 〉 means a flat average over all cities (i.e. not weighted by the population N of the city).
2 A “super-distribution” of τ of a country is obtained by aggregating the appropriately shifted LTR distributions over all “compatible”
elections. Compatible elections have roughly the same distribution P (τ−〈τ〉), i.e. without normalization by its standard-deviation. They
are chosen as follows: for Canada and Poland all elections; for France all pure national elections (nor combined with local elections, i.e.
all elections apart from 1998-rg, 2004-rg, 2001-mun and 2008-mun); for Mexico 2003-D and 2009-D; for Germany 2005-D and 2009-D;
all Chamber of Deputies (D) elections for Austria, Spain, Italy and Switzerland; and for Romania, all elections apart from its European
Parliament election (see Appendix for more details).
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FIG. 1. Probability distribution of the
rescaled variable u over all communes for
France. A standardized Gaussian is also
shown. We use the same symbols and color
codes for the French elections throughout
this paper.
Country dKS skewness kurtosis Country dKS skewness kurtosis
Fr
1.49±0.47 1.08±0.15 4.8±1.3
At
1.44±0.54 0.10±0.38 0.53±0.81
(1.42±0.45) (1.10±0.14) (5.1±0.9) (0.93±0.19) (-0.13±0.21) (0.54±0.43)
Pl
0.80±0.20 0.12±0.26 0.38±0.42
Ge
3.0±1.1 0.48±0.30 1.6±0.9
(0.80±0.20) (0.12±0.26) (0.38±0.42) (0.81) (0.20±0.05) (1.53±0.04)
Sp
1.78±0.68 0.27±0.25 1.8±1.1
It
0.70±0.09 -0.45±0.11 1.01±0.02
(1.24) (0.07±0.21) (2.5±1.2) (0.68) (-0.45±0.15) (1.01±0.003)
CH
1.67±0.43 0.51±0.08 1.4±1.4
Mx
1.28±0.35 0.32±0.09 1.1±0.8
(0.47) (2.9) (1.19) (0.35±0.11) (1.6±0.3)
Ca
1.23±0.39 -0.40±0.39 4.4±0.9
Ro
1.06±0.39 0.05±0.43 1.5±0.4
(1.23±0.39) (-0.40±0.39) (4.4±0.9) (0.95±0.36) (-0.14±0.25) (1.6±0.4)
TABLE I. Mean and standard-deviation of KS distances (dKS) between all pairs of elections within each country. Mean and
standard-deviation of skewness and kurtosis of distributions of τ over all municipalities is also given for each country. In
parentheses, the same measures but restricted to compatibles elections in each country.
example, the trend is completely reversed in Poland, with more complicated patterns for parliament elections in Italy
or Germany. Similarly, the standard-deviation of τ , σN , also depends quite strongly on N (see Figs 4 and 5 below).
However, the distribution QN (v) of the rescaled variable v = (τ −mN )/σN over all cities of size N for each election
can be considered to be universal from a KS point of view, both within the same country for different N but now
also, when N is large enough, across different countries. For example, the average KS distance between distributions
corresponding to different ranges of N in France is equal to 0.58, with standard-deviation 0.12. These numbers are
Fr At Pl Ge Sp It Cz Mx CH Ca Ro
Fr 0 5.01 5.61 8.00 2.28 6.13 0.93 2.18 0.83 6.72 2.66
At 5.01 0 1.62 1.49 2.43 1.58 3.24 2.31 2.25 4.60 1.57
Pl 5.61 1.62 0 2.32 2.41 3.12 3.16 1.83 2.06 6.62 1.99
Ge 8.00 1.49 2.32 0 3.74 1.73 4.84 2.81 2.83 7.15 2.85
Sp 2.28 2.43 2.41 3.74 0 3.17 1.71 2.19 1.11 3.53 0.95
It 6.13 1.58 3.12 1.73 3.17 0 3.65 3.13 2.58 4.62 2.05
Cz 0.93 3.24 3.16 4.84 1.71 3.65 0 2.12 0.58 2.45 1.94
Mx 2.18 2.31 1.83 2.81 2.19 3.13 2.12 0 1.87 4.06 1.95
CH 0.83 2.25 2.06 2.83 1.11 2.58 0.58 1.87 0 1.44 1.39
Ca 6.72 4.60 6.62 7.15 3.53 4.62 2.45 4.06 1.44 0 2.78
Ro 2.66 1.57 1.99 2.85 0.95 2.05 1.94 1.95 1.39 2.78 0
TABLE II. Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between different “super-distributions”.
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FIG. 2. Average value, mN ,
of the conditional distribu-
tion P (τ |N), for all coun-
tries and all elections. These
quantities are obtained as av-
erages over bins with 100
(200 for France) municipali-
ties of size ≈ N .
1000 ≤ N < 2000 2000 ≤ N < 4000 4000 ≤ N < 8000 8000 ≤ N < 16000 16000 ≤ N
dKS 1.47±0.77 1.38±0.65 0.94±0.48 0.91±0.46 0.95±0.48
TABLE III. Mean and standard-deviation over all pairs of countries of the KS distance dKS between the aggregated QN(v)
distributions in each country, for different values of N .
respectively 0.72± 0.20, 0.58± 0.13 and 0.87± 0.36 for Italy, Spain and Germany.3 In Table III, we show for different
bins of N values the mean and standard-deviation KS distance between countries, illustrating that all distributions
are statistically compatible, at least when N is large enough.
Now, even if QN(v) is universal and equal to Q
∗(v), P (u) will reflect the country-specific (and possibly election-
specific) shapes of mN and σN , and the country-specific distribution of city sizes, ρ(N). Indeed, one has:
P (τ) =
∑
N
ρ(N)Q∗
(
τ −mN
σN
)
, (3)
which has no reason whatsoever to be universal. But since for a given country the dependence on N of mN , σN and
ρ(N) tends to change only weakly in time, the approximate universality of P (u) for a given country follows from that
of QN (v). In fact, French national elections can be grouped into two families, such that the dependence of mN on
N is the same within each family but markedly different for the two families (see next section and Fig. 3 below).
Restricting the KS tests to pairs within each families now leads to an average KS distance of ≈ 1.25 with a standard
deviation ≈ 0.4 (identical for the two families), substantially smaller than dKS = from Table I. This goes to show
that the election specific shape of mN is indeed partly responsible for the weak non-universality of P (u).
3 We have excluded the smallest cities, N < 200, that are have a distinctly larger KS distance with other cities – see below. Bins, ranked
according to the municipality size N contain each around 500 municipalities.
5Country 1000 ≤ N < 2000 2000 ≤ N < 4000 4000 ≤ N < 8000 8000 ≤ N < 16000 16000 ≤ N
Fr 2.50 2.15 1.18 0.71 0.86
At 2.03 1.82 0.76 0.98 1.58
Pl 0.45 1.45 0.89 1.40 1.20
Ge 1.75 2.78 2.55 2.49 3.08
Sp 0.70 0.83 0.71 0.63 0.69
It 2.69 3.74 3.11 2.32 0.88
Cz 0.63 0.73 0.55 0.37 0.61
Mx 1.50 0.79 0.55 0.97 0.48
CH 1.38 1.49 0.65 0.69 0.44
Ca 3.48 1.09 0.60 0.53 0.59
Ro 1.73 1.48 1.14 0.63 0.92
TABLE IV. KS distance between QN(v) and a normalized Gaussian for different ranges of N and for different countries.
Country dKS skew kurt
Fr 2.55 -0.02 0.31
At 2.63 -0.05 0.15
Pl 2.13 0.18 0.58
Ge 4.09 -0.21 0.05
Sp 1.03 -0.16 0.41
It 5.61 -0.67 0.79
Cz 0.83 -0.32 0.30
Mx 1.21 0.12 -0.06
CH 1.85 0.24 0.88
Ca 2.93 -0.75 2.14
Ro 2.36 -0.06 1.25
Tab. V-a
Range of N dKS skew kurt
1000 ≤ N < 2000 2.25 -0.07 0.43
2000 ≤ N < 4000 3.50 -0.12 0.44
4000 ≤ N < 8000 2.90 -0.12 0.42
8000 ≤ N < 16000 1.74 -0.13 0.31
16000 ≤ N 1.74 -0.19 0.43
Tab. V-b
TABLE V. KS distance (dKS) to a standardized Gaussian, and low-moment skewness (skew) and kurtosis (kurt) of aggregated
distributions Q∗(v). Tab. V-a: data are aggregated over all N for each country. Tab. V-b: data are aggregated over all countries
for fixed N .
Zooming in now on details, we give in Table IV the KS distance between QN (v) aggregated over all elections of a
country and a normalized Gaussian, for different ranges of N and different countries. The skewness and kurtosis of
the distribution Q∗(v) and the KS distance to a Gaussian, aggregated over all N , are given in Table V-a for different
countries, and aggregated over countries for fixed N in Table V-b. Two features emerge from these Tables:
• While for some countries (Cz, Sp, Mx) the deviation of QN(v) from a Gaussian appear small (both measured
by KS or by the skewness and kurtosis), such an assumption is clearly unacceptable for Italy and Germany, for
which the KS distance is large for all N (see Table IV) and a substantial negative skewness can be measured.
Furthermore, the aggregated distribution (over all N) is clearly incompatible with a Gaussian except in the
Czech Republic, Spain and Mexico.
• There is an interesting systematic N dependence of the distance to a Gaussian, which is on average smaller for
larger Ns, and maximum for small cities. This suggests that although the KS tests is unable to distinguish
strongly the QN(v) for different N , there is in fact a systematic evolution for which we provide an argument
below. In fact, as clearly seen in Table III, the average KS distance between the QN of different countries is
also systematically smaller as N increases.
IV. A THEORETICAL CANEVAS
In order to delve deeper into the meaning of the above results, we need a theoretical framework. In [10], we proposed
to extend the classical theory of choice to account for spatial heterogeneities. A registered voter i makes the decision
6to vote (Si = 1) or not (Si = 0) on a given election. We can view this binary decision as resulting from a continuous
and unbounded variable ϕi ∈]−∞,+∞[ that we called intention (or propensity to vote). The final decision depends
on the comparison between ϕi and a threshold value −Φth: Si = 1 when ϕi > −Φth, and Si = 0 otherwise. In [10],
the intention ϕi(t) of an agent at time t who lives in a city a, located in the vicinity of ~Ra, was decomposed as:
ϕi(t) = ǫi(t) + φ(~Ra, t) + µa(t); (4)
where ǫi(t) is the instantaneous and idiosyncratic contribution to the intention that is specific to voter i, and φ(~R, t)
and µa(t) are fields that locally bias the decision of agents living in the same area. The first field φ is assumed to be
smooth (i.e. slowly varying in time and space), as the result of the local influences of the surroundings. This is what
we called a “cultural field”, that transports (in space) and keeps the memory (in time) of the collective intentions. The
second field µa, on the other hand, is city- and election-specific, and by assumption has small inter-city correlations.
It reflects all the elements in the intention that depend on the city: its size, the personality of its mayor, the specific
importance of the election that might depend on the socio-economic background of its inhabitants, as well as the
fraction of them who recently settled in the city, etc. (See [10] for a more thorough discussion of Eq. (4).)
Consider now N agents living in the same city, i.e. with under the influence of same field values φ and µ. The
turnout rate π is by definition:
π =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Si. (5)
For N sufficiently large, and if the agents make independent decisions, the Central Limit Theorem tells us that:
π ≈ p+
√
p(1− p)
N
ξ, (6)
where p = P(ϕ > −Φth) is the probability that the conviction of the voter is strong enough, and ξ is a standardized
Gaussian noise. If, on the other hand, agents make correlated decisions (for example, everybody in a family decides
to vote or not to vote under the influence of a strong leader), one expects the variance of the noise term to increase
by a certain “herding” factor h ≥ 1, which measures the average size of strongly correlated groups. Therefore we will
write more generally:
π ≈ p+
√
h p(1− p)
N
ξ. (7)
Following a standard assumption in Choice Theory, we take the idiosyncratic ǫ’s to have a logistic distribution with
zero mean and standard-deviation Σ, in which case the expression of p becomes:
p =
1
1 + exp(−φ+µ+Φth
Σ
)
. (8)
This allows one to obtain a very simple expression for the LTR τ :
τ = ln(
π
1− π
) ≈ β · (φ+ µ+Φth) +
√
h
Np(1− p)
ξ, (9)
where β ≡ 1/Σ. Therefore, in this model, the statistics of τ directly reflects that of the cultural and idiosyncratic
fields.
Let us work out some consequences of the above decomposition, and how they relate to the above empirical findings.
Since the cultural field φ is by definition not attached to a particular city, it is reasonable to assume that φ and β are
uncorrelated. Without loss of generality, one can furthermore set 〈φ〉 = 〈µ〉 = 0. Therefore:
〈τ〉N = mN = 〈β〉NΦth + 〈βµ〉N . (10)
Two extreme scenarios can explain the N dependence of mN : one is that the dispersion term 〈β〉 is strongly N
dependent while the statistics of µ is N independent, the other is that β is essentially constant and reflects an
intrinsic dispersion common to all voters in a population, while the average of the city-dependent field µ depends
strongly on the size of the city. Of course, all intermediate scenarios are in principle possible too, but the data is
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tions (European, Re´gionales); and c) Mid-
dle curves: Municipales (see text). Each
point comes from the average over around
200 communes of size ≈ N .
not precise enough to hone in the precise relative contribution of the two effects. Here, we want to argue that the
dependence of µ on N is likely to be dominant. Indeed, if the first scenario was correct, one should observe:
mN = 〈τ〉N ≈ 〈β〉NΦth (11)
The decrease of mN as a function of N would therefore mean that 〈β〉N itself is a decreasing function of N when the
mean LTR is positive. This is a priori reasonable: one expects more heterogeneity (and therefore a larger Σ, and a
smaller β) in large cities than in small cities. However, the same model would imply a smaller dependence on N for
low turnout rates, and even an inverted dependence of mN on N for elections with a very low turnover rate, such that
〈τ〉 < 0. This is not observed: quite on the contrary, the mN dependence is compatible with a mere vertical shift for
similar elections, see Fig. 3.
On the other hand, a model where β is constant, independent of N and to a first approximation on the election,
leads to:
〈τ〉N = mN = β [Φth + 〈µ〉N ] , (12)
which appears to be a good representation of reality. The dependence of 〈µ〉N – the average propensity to vote – on
N , could be the result of several intuitive mechanisms: for example, voters in small cities are less likely to be absent
on election day (usually a sunday in France); the result of an election is sometimes more important in small cities
than in large cities (for example, election of the mayor); the social pressure from the rest of the community is stronger
in small cities; all these effects suggest that the average turnout rate is stronger in small cities. In order to explain the
opposite behaviour (as in Poland), or a non-monotonous dependence, as in Italy or Germany for parliament elections,
a systematic dependence of β on N might be relevant, although one should probably dwell into local idiosyncracies.
Figure 3 suggests that in France three families of elections clearly appear: a) “important” national elections
(Presidential, Referendums, Parliament), for which mN shows a change of concavity around N = 1000; b) less
important national elections (European, Re´gionales) for which the average turnout is low, for which the change of
concavity is absent; and c) Municipales for which the variation of mN between small and large cities is the largest (as
can be expected a priori). Note that the difference ∆m between the mean LTR for small and large cities is markedly
different in the three cases: ∆m ≈ 0.7 in case a), ∆m ≈ 0.95 in case b), and ∆m ≈ 1.65 in case c).
As a first approximation, we thus take β to be constant for all cities. The standard-deviation of τ over all cities of
a given size then writes:
σ2N = β
2
[
〈φ2〉+ 〈µ2〉N − 〈µ〉
2
N
]
+
h
N
〈
1
p(1 − p)
〉N . (13)
We show in Fig. 4 the quantity σ2N minus the trivial binomial contribution, i.e. the last term of the RHS of the
above equation, as a function of N−3/4, for French elections. As predicted by the above model, we see that the
N →∞ limit is clearly positive ≈ 0.035± 0.05, and to a good approximation independent of the election – including
the Municipales: although the N dependence of σ2N is found to be markedly different (as N
−1/4), this quantity still
extrapolates to the same asymptotic value. If one believes that our interpretation of φ as a persistent cultural field
is correct, there is in fact no reason to expect that σ2φ = 〈φ
2〉 should change at all from election to election. The
above result is therefore compatible with the fact that β is to a first approximation election independent, as already
suggested by Fig. 3 above. The same results hold for all other countries, although the statistics is not as good as in
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the case of France: the asymptotic value of σ2N for N → ∞ is only weakly dependent on the election, and β
2σ2
∞
in
the range 0.03− 0.12 for all countries. Furthermore, the N -dependence of σ2N is found to be roughly compatible with
N−ω with ω ≤ 1 in all cases.
If β is constant, the N -dependent contribution of σ2N must come from the variance of the city-specific contribution
µ. A simple-minded model for the statistics of µ predicts a variance that should decrease as N−1. Indeed, a large city
can be thought of as a patchwork of n ∝ N independent small neighbourhoods, each with a specific value of µ. The
effective value of µ for the whole city has a variance that is easily found to be reduced by a factor n, and therefore
σ2N ∝ N
−1. A weaker dependence of σ2N on N signals the existence of strong inter-neighbourhood correlations (or
strong heterogeneities in the size of neighbourhoods), that lead to a reduction of the effective number of independent
neighbourhood from n ∝ N to n ∝ Nω with ω < 1. These inter-neighbourhood correlations are indeed expected, since
some of the socio-economic and cultural factors affecting the decision of voters are clearly associated to the whole
city. Interestingly, these correlations should be stronger for local elections, which is indeed confirmed by the fact that
ω is markedly smaller for the Municipales elections in France. We therefore find the interpretation of the anomalous
N dependence of σ2N as due to the city-specific contribution µ rather compelling.
Let us now turn to the distribution of the rescaled variable v. Within the above model, and again assuming that
β is constant, one finds that:
v =
τ −mN
σN
∝ β(φ+ µ− 〈µ〉N ) +
√
h
Np(1− p)
ξ. (14)
The last “binomial” term quickly becomes Gaussian as N increases, and is at least four times smaller than the first
two terms when N > 1000 (when h = 1). Since the cultural field φ is, according to the model proposed in [10], the
result of averaging random influences over long time scales and large length scales, one expects, from the Central Limit
Theorem, that φ is close to a Gaussian field as well. However, the statistics of µ has no reason to be Gaussian for
small cities N , for which it reflects local and instantaneous idiosyncracies, and for which no averaging argument can
be invoked. The “universality” of QN (v) across countries is therefore probably only apparent, since there is no reason
to expect that the distribution of µ is independent of the country. In fact, QN(v) in countries like Italy, Germany &
the Czech Republic do exhibit a stronger skewness than in other countries. Still, according to the above discussion,
the contribution of different neighbourhoods to µ must average out as N increases, and one expects the distribution
of µ itself to become more and more Gaussian as N increases.
To sum up: the random variable v is the sum of three independent random variables, two of which can be considered
as Gaussian, while the third has a distribution that depends on N and becomes more Gaussian for large N , with
a variance that decreases as N−ω. This allows one to rationalize the above empirical findings on the distributions
QN (v): these are more and more Gaussian as N increases, and closer to one another for different countries, since the
country specific contribution µ becomes smaller (as N−ω) and itself more Gaussian.
It is instructive to compare the relative contribution to the variance of the turnout rates of the cultural field φ
on the one hand, and of the city-specific field on the other. The latter can be obtained by subtracting from the
total variance of the LTR, σ2τ , the contribution of the cultural field β
2σ2φ which is obtained as the extrapolation of
σ2N to N → ∞ (see Figs 4 & 5) and the average contribution of the binomial noise, 〈h/Np(1 − p)〉. The herding
factor h can be estimated using the method introduced in [10], which compares different elections for which the
binomial noises are by definition uncorrelated (see Eq. (10) of Ref. [10]). The ratio of r = σ2µ/σ
2
φ can be seen as
an objective measure of the heterogeneity of behaviour in country, i.e. how strongly local idiosyncracies can depart
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〉N as a function of N
−1/2 for each
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from the global trend. Table VI gives the ratio r for all studied countries. Using this measure, we find that the
most heterogeneous countries are Canada and the Czech Republic,4 and the most homogeneous ones are Austria,
Switzerland and Romania. Not surprisingly, however, the largest value of r is found for the French Municipales, i.e.
local elections, for which idiosyncratic effects are indeed expected to be large. Note also that the herding ratio is
anomalously high for Romania (h = 8.5), and quite substantial for Poland (h = 4.7). Finally, it is interesting to notice
that the quantity βσφ depends only weakly on the country (it varies by a factor 1.7 between France and Italy). Since
the total intention ϕ is only defined up to an arbitrary scale, one can always set σφ = 1. Therefore, we find that the
idiosyncratic dispersion 1/β (or the propensity not to conform to the norm encoded by the cultural field) is strongest
in France, Poland and the Czech Republic, and weakest in Italy and Austria.
V. SPATIAL CORRELATIONS OF TURNOUT RATES
Another striking empirical finding reported in [10, 22] is the logarithmic dependence of the spatial correlation of
the LTR as a function of distance. The spatial pattern of the local fluctuations of the LTR in European countrie are
shown in Fig. 6. One clearly sees the presence of long-ranged correlations. More precisely, for the 13 French elections
studied there, one finds that the spatial correlation of τ ′(~Rα) = τ(~Rα)−mNα (where ~Rα is the spatial location of the
city and mN is the average of τ over cities of similar sizes) decreases as:
C(~r) = 〈τ ′(~R + ~r)τ ′(~R)〉 ≈ −C0 ln
r
L
, (15)
where L is of the order of the size of the country. We show in Fig. 7 the average C(r) for all French elections (except
the two Municipales elections) and in Fig. 8 the normalized correlation functions for all elections, separately for each
4 Although the ratios for Ca, Mx, Cz and Ge might be overestimated because the data did not allow us to estimate the herding ratio h
in these two cases.
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Country σ2τ h ω β
2σ2φ (N →∞) β
2σ2φ (Eq. 19) 〈h/(Np(1− p)〉 β
2σ2µ r = σ
2
µ/σ
2
φ
Fr 0.13 0.8† 3/4 0.035 0.035 0.03 0.065 1.85
Fr (mun) 0.35 1 1/4 0.035 0.035 0.045 0.27 7.7
At 0.13 2.9 1/2 0.09 0.14 0.025 0.015 0.17
Pl 0.085 4.7 1/2 0.035 0.065 0. 0.05 1.4
Ge 0.15 0.⋆ 1/4 0.05 0.105 0.01 0.09 1.8
Sp 0.195 0.7† 1/8 0.06 0.115 0.035 0.10 1.7
It 0.15 2.2 1/4 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.3
CH 0.155 0.6† 1/2 0.065 0.105 0.015 0.075 0.85
Cz 0.165 NA♦ 1/2 0.035 0.035 0.025 0.105 3.
Ro 0.11 8.5 1/2 0.07 NA 0.015 0.025 0.36
Ca 0.2 1♭ 1/2 0.03 NA 0.015 0.155 5.1
Mx 0.27 0.† 1/2 0.1 NA 0.002 0.17 1.7
TABLE VI. Decomposition of the total LTR variance into a cultural field component β2σ2φ, and city-specific component β
2σ2µ,
and a binomial component, 〈h/(Np(1 − p)〉, corrected by a herding coefficient h ≥ 1. This last term is determined using the
method proposed in [10], which leads to a herding coefficient h given in the second column. †: when the direct fit gives a value
of h less than unity, we enforce h = 1. ⋆: the case of Germany seems to be special, maybe due to a large fraction of postal
votes. ♦: the method to determine h requires more than one election, and therefore cannot be applied to the Czech Republic.
In this case, we also set h = 1 by default. ♭: Missing data prevents us from determining h precisely, so we again set h = 1 by
default. The value of the exponent ω is only indicative, since in some countries the power-law assumption is not warranted, see
Fig. 5. We give two values for β2σ2φ: one as the asymptotic extrapolation of σ
2
N − 〈h/(Np(1− p)〉 for N →∞ and the second
from the rescaling coefficient C∗, see below and Fig. 9. Both these determinations are only precise to within roughly ±20%.
FIG. 6. Heat map of the normalized logarithmic turnout rate τ−mN
σN
, for the 2004 European Parliament election in France,
Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Germany had nomenclature reform of their municipalities which make more difficult to
efficiently join spatial data to electoral data. Note the strongly heterogenous, but long-range correlated nature of the pattern.
Note also some strong regionalities, for example in the German regions of Sarre or Bade-Wurtemberg, where the average turnout
rate is strong and sharply falls across the region boundaries. In these cases, the implicit assumption of a translation invariant
statistical pattern that we make to compute C(r) is probably not warranted, and it would in fact be better to treat these
regions independently.
country for which the geographic position of cities is available to us.
Using the above decomposition, and noting that by assumption the fluctuations of µ(~R) around the suitable size
dependent average 〈µ〉N have short-ranged correlations, one concludes that the long-range, logarithmic correlations
above must come from those of the cultural field φ. One indeed finds:
C(~r 6= 0) ≈ 〈φ(~R + ~r)φ(~R)〉, (16)
since the other two terms only contribute for ~r = 0. As a consistency check of this decomposition, one should find
that C(~r) should quickly decay from C(r = 0) to C(r → 0+) ≈ β2σ2φ (e.g. ≈ 0.035± 0.05 for France). This is indeed
seen to be well borne out, see Fig. 7. The agreement between two completely different determination of β2σ2φ (one
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FIG. 8. Normalized spatial correlations C˜(r) of τ ′ = τ − mN for all countries for which the geographic position of cities is
available. The correlation is normalized by the variance of τ ′, such that C˜(r = 0) ≡ 1. For labels of elections, see Figs. 1, 2.
using the extrapolation of σ2N to infinite sizes, and the second using C(r)) holds very well for France, Italy and the
Czech Republic, and only approximately for other countries (see Tab. VI and Fig. 5).
Inspired by a well-known model in statistical physics where these logarithmic correlations appear, we postulated in
[10] that the field φ evolves according to a diffusion equation, driven by a random noise, which is meant to describe
the exchange of ideas and opinions between nearby cities and the random nature of the shocks that may affect the
cultural substrate. As we argued in [10], the fact that people move around and carry with them some components
of the local cultural specificity leads to a local propagation of φ(~Rα, t). Through human interactions, the cultural
differences between nearby cities tend to narrow according to:
∂φ(~Rα, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
infl.
=
∑
β
Γαβ [φ(~Rβ , t)− φ(~Rα, t)], (17)
where Γαβ(rαβ) ≥ 0 is a symmetric influence matrix, that we assume to decrease over a distance corresponding to
regular displacements of individuals, say 10 km or so. For concreteness, we take: Γαβ(r) = Γ0e
−r/ℓc . As is well
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FIG. 9. Average of spatial correlation, rescaled. Left: Average over numerical simulations of the model (with ℓc = 4.5 km)
with the true positions of all cities for each country. Right: Average over real election data for each country. We also
shown the average and standard deviation (coming from different realizations of the noise history η, and plotted as error bars)
corresponding to the numerical model for French cities.
known, the continuum limit of the right hand side of Eq. (17) reads D∆φ(~R, t), where ∆ is the Laplacian and
D(~Rα) =
1
2
∑
β r
2
αβΓαβ is a measure of the speed at which the cultural field diffuses. Random cultural “shocks” add
to the above equation a noise term η(~Rα, t).
If cities were located on the nodes of a regular lattice of linear size L, it would be easy to compute analytically the
stationary correlation function of the field φ. It is found to be given by a logarithm function of distance, provided
L≫ ℓc:
Cφ(r) ∝ ln
L
r
, ℓc ≪ r ≪ L. (18)
However, the spatial distribution of cities in real countries is quite strongly heterogeneous, which leads to significant
deviation from a pure logarithmic decay. In order to compare quantitatively our model with empirical data, we have
therefore simulated the model using Eq. (17) with the exact locations of all cities for the different countries under
consideration. The results, averaged over many histories of the noise term, are shown in Fig. 9-left for ℓc = 4.5 km,
(but changing ℓc from 1.5 km to 9 km hardly changes the curves). Quite remarkably, we see that Cφ(r) exhibits a
significant concavity, very similar to what is observed for the empirical correlations. In order to see that the model
is indeed compatible with observations, we have plotted in Fig. 9-right the empirical data superimposed with the
prediction of the model for the French case (for which the data is best). The empirical correlation C(r) is rescaled by
a country dependent value C∗ in order to achieve the best rescaling. This value of C∗ allows us to obtain a second
determination of β2σ2φ, through the relation:
β2σ2φ = β
2σ2φ
∣∣
Fr.
C∗. (19)
Note however that the numerical model predicts a rather large dispersion around the average result, that comes from
a strong dependence on the noise realisation η(~Rα, t). One should therefore expect that the empirical data (which
corresponds to only a few histories) departs from the average theoretical curve, in a way perfectly compatible with
Fig. 9-right. This also means that there is quite a bit of leeway in determination of C∗, which is only determined to
within ±20%. Finally, note that the shape of C(r) for Germany is significantly different, with a pronounced change
of regime around r ≈ 70 km. This is clearly related to the strong regional idiosyncracies that we discussed in Fig. 6.
We conclude that our numerical model reproduces very satisfactorily the observations for all studied countries
(with the possible exception of Germany, for the reason noted above). This lends strong support to the existence,
conjectured in [10], of an underlying diffusive cultural field responsible for both the long-range correlation (in space)
and persistence (in time) of voting habits.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that the empirical results for the statistics of turnout rates established in [10] for
some French elections appear to hold much more generally. We believe that the most striking result is the logarithmic
dependence of the spatial correlations of these turnout rates. This result is quantitatively reproduced by a decision
model that assumes that each voter makes his mind as a result of three influence terms: one totally idiosyncratic
component, one city-specific term with short-ranged fluctuations in space, and one long-ranged correlated field which
propagates diffusively in space. The sum of these three contributions is what we call the “intention”. A detailed
analysis of our data sets has revealed several interesting (and sometimes unexpected) features: a) the city-specific
term has a variance that depends on the size N of the city as N−ω with ω < 1, suggesting strong inter-city correlations;
b) different countries have different degrees of local heterogeneities, defined as the ratio of the variance of the city-
dependent term over the variance of the cultural field; c) different countries seem to be characterized by a different
propensity for individuals to conform to a cultural norm; d) there are clear signs of herding (i.e. strongly correlated
decisions at the individual level) in some countries, but not in others; e) the statistics of the logarithmic turnout rates
become more and more Gaussian as N increases.
Although we have confirmed the existence of a diffusive cultural field using election data from different countries, we
feel that more work should be done to establish the general relevance of this idea to other decision making processes.
It would be extremely interesting to find other data sets that would enable one to study the spatial correlations of
decision making. An obvious candidate would be consumer habits – for example the consumption pattern of some
generic goods, or the success of some movie, etc.
Finally, we believe that our detailed analysis of the statistics of turnout rates (or more generally of election results)
reveals both stable patterns and subtle features, that could be used to test for possible data manipulation or frauds,
or to define interesting “democracy” indexes. In that respect, the existence of strong herding effects in some countries
is somewhat disturbing.
VII. MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Appendix gives more information about the set of (public) electoral data studied in this paper. Most of them
can be directly downloaded from official websites (see References).
Average values and standard-deviations do not take into account extreme values in order to remove some electoral
errors, etc. Electoral values greater than 5 sigma are not taken into account 5.
APPENDIX: DETAILS ON THE DATA SOURCES
Table VII shows the nature of the 77 national elections from 11 countries, studied at the municipality scale.
Countries are: France (Fr)6, Austria (At)7, Poland (Pl), Germany (Ge)8, Spain (Sp), Italy (It), Swiss (CH)9, Czech
Republic (Cz), Canada (Ca), Romania (Ro)10 and Mexico (Mx). Note that all the studied elections occurred in a
same time over all the country (apart from 2 La¨nder elections in Germany) and are free of compulsory voting. Lastly,
in our database for Germany, postal votes (Briehwahlen) are taken into account in some La¨nder, not in others, which
artificially increases turnout heterogeneity between German regions.
Moreover Election turnout statistics have been located, identified and geocoded, based on a set of points, which
were obtained by calculating the gravity center of each municipality or the position of the town-hall, and then adding
the X and Y coordinates for each of these features. In addition to these coordinates, the objects are described with
several attributes: logarithmic turnout rate, τ , normalized logarithmic turnout rate, v, etc. This concerns 8 countries
amongst the 11 previous ones 11: Austria [23], Czech Republic [24], France [25], Germany [26], Italy [27], Poland [28],
Spain [29] and Switzerland [30]. This study is limited to mainland municipalities (and each considered country have
more than two thousands municipalities). Lambert 2 e´tendu is used for France, while WGS 84 coordinate system is
used for other countries.
5 For instance let 100 municipalities of size ≈ N (as in Fig. 2), each one has a LTR τi (i = 1, 2, ...,100). First, 〈τ〉 and σ are the average
value and the standard-deviation of τ over these 100 municipalities. Next, the final average value mN and the final standard-deviation,
σN , over this sample of 100 municipalities are uniquely evaluated for municipalities, i, such that |τi − 〈τ〉| < 5 σ.
6 1994 and 2004 Re´gionales elections occurred at the same time as strictly local elections (cantonales, i.e. at a kind of county level) in
half of municipalities.
7 Postal votes (Wahlkarten) are not taking account in this paper.
8 La¨nd Parliament elections at time less or equal to 2004 (or 2010) in each Land are written here as ‘2004-Ld’ (or ‘2010-Ld’).
9 The referendums or votations (R(a) and R(b)) respectively occurred on March 11th and July 17th 2007.
10 The referendum studied here (about the Parlament unicameral and the reduction of the maximum of deputies) occurred at the same
time than the first round of the Presidential election. Some Romanian electors, not registered in the lista electorala permanenta, are
able to vote. For this country, we pursue to write N the Number of Register Voters, N+ the registered electors who take part to the
election.
11 The Mexican spatial repartition of municipalities is so widely heterogeneous than the spatial study made for other countries is no longer
efficient here.
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Ctry #el mun spa elections
Fr 22 36000 Y
1992-R, 1993-D, 1994-E, 1995-P1, 1995-P2, 1997-D, 1998-rg, 1999-E, 2000-R, 2001-mun, 2002-P1,
2002-P2, 2002-D, 2004-rg, 2004-E, 2005-R, 2007-P1, 2007-P2, 2007-D, 2008-mun, 2009-E, 2010-rg
At 13 2400 Y 1994-D, 1995-D, 1996-E, 1998-P, 1999-E, 1999-D, 2002-D, 2004-P, 2004-E, 2006-D, 2008-D, 2009-E, 2010-P
Pl 11 2500 Y 2000-P1, 2001-D, 2003-R, 2004-E, 2005-D, 2005-P1, 2005-P2, 2007-D, 2009-E, 2010-P1, 2010-P2
Ge 7 12000 Y 2002-D, 2004-Ld, 2005-D, 2009-E, 2009-D, 2010-Ld
Sp 4 8000 Y 2004-D, 2004-E, 2008-D, 2009-E
It 4 7200 Y 2004-E, 2006-D, 2008-D, 2009-E
CH 3 2700 Y 2007-R(1), 2007-R(2), 2007-D
Cz 1 6200 Y 2003-R
Ca 5 7700 N 1997-D, 2000-D, 2004-D, 2006-D, 2008-D
Ro 4 3200 N 2009-E, 2009-R, 2009-P1, 2009-P2
Mx 3 2400 N 2003-D, 2006-D, 2009-D
TABLE VII. Nature of elections studied in this paper. For each country (Ctry), the number of elections (#el) and the number
of municipalities(mun) in the mainland are written. ”Y” (or reversely ”N”) mentions that municipalities are spatially (spa)
localized. For each country, an election is identified by its year date and its nature. D: Chamber of Deputies election; E:
European parliament election; P: presidential election (according to the constitution of the country, in only one round); P1 and
P2: first and second round of a Presidential election; R: Referendum; Ld: German La¨nder elections; rg: French Re´gionales
elections; mun: French municipales. For each country elections are given in a chronological order (but the 2009 Romanian
Presidential (P) and Referendum (R) elections occurred the same day). Even if an election needs two rounds, only the first one
is considered (e.g. the French Chamber of Deputies (D), Re´gionales (rg) and municipales (mun) elections) unless the contrary
is indicated (e.g. P1 and P2).
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